Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 46
Issue 4 Summer 2015

Article 3

2015

United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educational Services,
Inc.: The Seventh Circuit Reinvigorates the False
Claims Act to Combat Recruiting Abuses by ForProfit Schools
Mark I. Labaton
Partner, Isaacs Friedberg & Labaton LLP, Los Angeles, CA

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Education Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark I. Labaton, United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.: The Seventh Circuit Reinvigorates the False Claims Act to
Combat Recruiting Abuses by For-Profit Schools, 46 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 815 (2015).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol46/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

LABATON PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/27/2015 2:28 PM

United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educational
Services, Inc.: The Seventh Circuit Reinvigorates the
False Claims Act to Combat Recruiting Abuses by
For-Profit Schools
Mark I. Labaton*
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) is the government’s primary tool in
combatting procurement fraud. It allows the United States to litigate
cases alleging fraudulent claims against governmental entities, and also
allows whistleblowers (called relators) to bring such cases, litigate
them on behalf of the government, and collect a share of the proceeds.
The viability of the FCA depends on its ability to encourage
whistleblowers to come forward and report fraud committed by
contractors with the government. One limitation on whistleblowers’
ability to litigate FCA cases is the so-called public-disclosure bar,
which bars claims that have been publicly exposed.1 This bar has an
exception for whistleblowers who are original sources of their claims.
Consistent with the legislative history of the FCA, the public-disclosure
bar should be interpreted narrowly while the original-source exception
should be interpreted broadly.
In a groundbreaking decision, the Seventh Circuit held in United
States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.,2 that a prior
lawsuit against a defendant for the same claim should not trigger the
public-disclosure bar when the later lawsuit discloses a different fraud
scheme from the one alleged in the earlier lawsuit. A contrary ruling
would have largely insulated fraudsters from FCA liability when they
alter their method of committing fraud.

* Mark I. Labaton is a partner at Isaacs Friedberg & Labaton LLP in Los Angeles, California.
He argued and briefed United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educational Services, Inc. in the
Seventh Circuit case that is the subject of this Article, and continues to represent Ms. Leveski in
that case. This Article is dedicated to the memory of his beloved life partner, Jinnie Hwang, who
passed away on July 4, 2014 as a result of a brain aneurysm that burst on July 1, 2014. The
author thanks Timothy Cornell, James Moody, and Oren Rosenthal for their thoughtful comments
on a draft of this Article.
1. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(3)(4) (2012).
2. 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Leveski builds on the teachings of two earlier recent Seventh Circuit
cases.3 Each case in this trilogy reversed district court opinions that
unduly restricted application of the FCA. Leveski is also seminal
because it marked the first time that an appellate court held that an
FCA lawyer could solicit whistleblower clients just like lawyers
practicing in other areas are able to do. In Leveski, the district court
sanctioned the lawyer who brought that lawsuit simply because the
whistleblower did not know her legal right to bring such a case before
that lawyer contacted her, even though there was no public disclosure
and, even if there had been, the whistleblower was the original source
of the allegations. The Seventh Circuit pointedly rejected such a
punitive approach, holding: “The annals of legal history are full of
examples of lawyers playing a vital role in encouraging parties to
litigate.”4
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 816
I. BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 819
A. The False Claims Act .............................................................. 819
B. The For-Profit School Industry ............................................... 825
C. ITT ........................................................................................... 829
D. The FCA and For-Profit Schools ............................................ 831
E. The Allegations in United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT ......... 838
F. The District Court’s Holding .................................................. 841
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE ............ 845
A. Public Disclosure .................................................................... 848
B. Original Source ....................................................................... 854
C. Lawyer Solicitation in False Claims Act Actions .................... 858
CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 862
INTRODUCTION
One of the fastest growing sectors of the American economy is the
for-profit school industry: a sector that depends for its survival on the
largess of the federal government and whose lifeblood is student loans.5
3. United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 680 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012);
United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 635 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011).
4. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 838.
5. See, e.g., Suevon Lee, The Explosive Growth of For-Profit Higher Education, By the
Numbers: High Tuition, Low Retention Rates, and Aggressive Recruiting Are Great for Business–
But Terrible for Education, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2012, 5:01 AM), http://www.motherj
ones.com/media/2012/08/explosive-growth-profit-higher-education-numbers (detailing growth,
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Almost all of this industry’s revenue comes from federal grants and
loans, as virtually all of its students receive federal financial aid paid for
through taxpayer funds.6 Accordingly, the temptation for fraud by
companies in this industry is great. As Benjamin Franklin famously
observed: “[T]here is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good
people more easily and frequently fall, than that of defrauding the
government . . . .”7
Since the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States ex rel. Main v.
Oakland City University8 in 2005, the False Claims Act (“FCA”) has
become a potential potent weapon to address reckless student recruiting
in the for-profit higher education industry—a serious national problem
that has damaged our economy and ruined many lives.9 Yet, the
viability of the FCA to protect taxpayers from fraud committed by
schools in the for-profit school industry was threatened by a recent
district court opinion and sanctions order in a case brought against ITT
Educational Services, Inc. (“ITT”),10 the parent company of a leading
for-profit school known for television recruiting advertisements that
blanket the daytime airwaves. Those decisions not only threatened to
discourage future whistleblowers from coming forward, but also
threatened the lawyers who represent them. But that threat abated with
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT
Educational Services, Inc.11 Leveski, like Main, ranks as an important
opinion in protecting vulnerable students and taxpayers at large while
helping insure that the FCA’s purposes are being served and that
statute’s power is not improperly eroded.12
A basic familiarity with the FCA and its history is helpful to
understand how Leveski advances the FCA’s goals. Thus, this Article
begins with a discussion of this statute. It then discusses Leveski in
cost of education, and loan figures in the for-profit higher education industry).
6. James Marshall Crotty, Obama Tightens Screws on For-Profit Colleges, FORBES (Oct. 30,
2014, 7:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmarshallcrotty/2014/10/30/new-gainful-empl
oyment-rules-tighten-screws-on-for-profit-colleges.
7. Benjamin Franklin, On Smuggling, LONDON CHRON., Nov. 24, 1767.
8. 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005).
9. See generally Gayland O. Hethcoat II, For-Profits Under Fire: The False Claims Act as a
Regulatory Check on the For-Profit Education Sector, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2011).
10. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012) (sanctions order), rev’d, 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir.
2013); United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00867-TWP-MJD,
2011 WL 3471071 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011) (dismissal order), rev’d, 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir.
2013).
11. 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2013).
12. As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the case was listed as one of the most
significant “big suits” of the past year. David Bario, Big Suits, AM. LAW., Sept. 2013, at 26.
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light of that history and FCA case law.
Nicknamed the Lincoln Law because of President Lincoln’s support,
the FCA was enacted during the Civil War to combat fraudulent
procurement practices. From its inception, and increasingly with its
1986 amendments, the FCA has encouraged private parties with
knowledge of fraud against the government to come forward with
information that might otherwise remain hidden. To incentivize
whistleblowers to expose fraud committed by the recipients of federal
funds, the FCA lets whistleblowers—called relators—bring civil
lawsuits on behalf of the United States and collect a bounty of up to
thirty percent of any recovery.13
The relator’s standing to pursue FCA cases, however, is limited by a
public-disclosure bar.14 That bar prevents the relator from litigating
cases based on conduct that has already been disclosed by the media or
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, unless that relator is an
“original source” of the allegations at issue.15 Simple as this concept
might seem, this bar has been the second most hotly contested area of
FCA litigation since the 1986 amendments.16 This bar is intended to
block lawsuits only where the relator’s contribution to uncovering fraud
brings no new information to the government; it is not intended to
discourage whistleblowing aimed at deterring fraud and ensuring that
taxpayers are made whole.17
In Leveski, the district court found that Ms. Leveski’s case was
previously publicly disclosed—and therefore barred—by an earlier FCA
case against ITT.18 But the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
prior lawsuit did not constitute a public disclosure because Ms.
Leveski’s complaint alleged two fraud schemes different from the one

13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012).
14. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
15. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
16. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1274, 1276–77 (2013)
(noting that the most litigated area is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and “[t]here are now
thousands of published decisions on the 1986 amendments”).
17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991) (“One theme recurring through the legislative
history in 1985 is the intent to encourage persons with first-hand knowledge of fraudulent
misconduct to report fraud. Congress sought to stop the ‘conspiracy of silence’ among
employees of corporations engaging in fraud.”); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5269, 5271 (stressing that in order to detect fraud it was
necessary to enlist the “cooperation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise
involved in the fraudulent activity”).
18. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794, at *13, *18 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012), rev’d, 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2013).
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scheme previously alleged in an earlier lawsuit.19
The district court also found that Ms. Leveski was not an original
source, because the court was skeptical that she understood the legal
significance of the Program Participation Agreement (“PPA”) that ITT
signed with the Department of Education (“DOE”). But the Seventh
Circuit also reversed, holding that Ms. Leveski clearly possessed
sufficient factual knowledge to be an original source.20
Finally, the district court sanctioned Ms. Leveski’s lawyers because
one of them talked to her about the FCA before she became a relator.21
Here too the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that attorney solicitation
and advice to a potential relator was appropriate.22
The Circuit’s protection of whistleblowers and their lawyers serves
the FCA’s aim of encouraging whistleblowers who know about fraud to
bring FCA actions, and is seminal in protecting lawyers who righteously
solicit such clients—an important buffer in today’s legal environment,
where the stakes in FCA cases are so high that defendants seeking to
avoid accountability have, as here, resorted to bullying and
intimidation.23
I. BACKGROUND
A. The False Claims Act
The FCA is a federal false and fraudulent claims statute that broadly
imposes liability against recipients of taxpayer money—including
contractors, beneficiaries, and grantees—who make false or fraudulent
claims or statements to federal agencies.24 The FCA empowers the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to sue on behalf of federal agencies.25 It

19. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2013).
20. Id. at 836.
21. Id. at 839.
22. Id. at 839–40.
23. Increasingly in cases involving allegations of egregious conduct, well-heeled defendants
have resorted to intimidation tactics. These include suing FCA relators for stealing documents to
use as evidence in their FCA cases or for breaching so-called duties to report fraud internally
before filing an FCA case. See Alison Frankel, Congress, Whistleblower Lawyers Urge SEC to
Police ‘De Facto Gag Clauses,’ REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-franke
l/2014/10/29/congress-whistleblower-lawyers-urge-sec-to-police-de-facto-gag-clauses (“Forbes
even ran a blog post in June advising healthcare employers how to take advantage of precedent in
such suits.”).
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med.,
Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 392 (1st Cir. 2011) (“‘Congress wrote expansively, meaning “to reach all types
of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.”’” (quoting
Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003))).
25. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (noting that this power stems from the head of the DOJ, the
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also allows private parties (called relators, though popularly known as
whistleblowers) to bring civil actions on behalf of taxpayers, who are
the real victims of government fraud.26
To encourage whistleblowers (who are often company insiders) to
report frauds that would otherwise likely remain hidden, relators are
entitled to a bounty of up to thirty percent of any recovery.27 Such
rewards can be substantial because the FCA allows successful parties to
recover treble damages and penalties of up to $11,000 per false claim or
statement in support of a false claim.28
FCA actions, brought by relators, are called “qui tam” suits because
they were first brought traditionally under English law by a person qui
tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, that is, by
persons who sue “on behalf of the King as well as for himself.”29
Although relators are entitled to a share of qui tam recoveries, because
the United States is the real party-in-interest in every qui tam lawsuit, it
has the right to intervene in the case at any time.30
Qui tam cases are filed under seal to give the United States time to
investigate the allegations and to make a preliminary decision to
intervene or to allow the relator and private counsel to proceed on their
own.31 The initial seal period is sixty days from the filing of the
complaint, but that period typically is extended, sometimes for years.32
The courts and the DOJ have consistently stressed that the United
States’ decision whether to intervene and take over control of qui tam
lawsuits, or alternatively, to allow the relator with private counsel to
control the litigation, is not a reflection of the merits of any particular
case.33
The FCA’s aim has always been to curtail rampant procurement
fraud. As Senator Jacob M. Howard, one of the sponsors of the original
legislation remarked, the Act offers:

United States Attorney General).
26. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
27. Id. § 3730(d).
28. Id.
29. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2).
31. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook Cnty., 277 F.3d 969, 974 n.5 (7th Cir.
2002) (“There is no reason to presume that a decision by the Justice Department not to assume
control of the suit is a commentary on its merits. The Justice Department may have myriad
reasons for permitting the private suit to go forward including limited prosecutorial resources and
confidence in the relator’s attorney.”).
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[A] reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his
coconspirator [sic], if he be such; but it is not confined to that
class. . . . I have based [it] . . . upon the old-fashioned idea of holding
out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to catch a rogue,” which is the
safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing
rogues to justice.34

Originally, the FCA allowed relators to use information taken
exclusively from public files “even though that private individual
contributed nothing to the exposure of the fraud alleged.”35 One such
case, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,36 made its way to the
Supreme Court at the outset of World War II. There, the United States
indicted some electrical contractors for collusive bidding in a
government project. The defendants pled nolo contendre and were
fined $54,000.37 Then, in the qui tam case arising from the same
conduct, the relator obtained a trial verdict of $315,000.38
The Supreme Court upheld the verdict, rejecting the argument that
allowing such claims would encourage “unseemly races for the
opportunity of profiting from the government investigations,” because
nothing in the original FCA prohibited such conduct.39 Although the
efficacy of the qui tam provisions of the FCA depend upon building a
private/public partnership between the relator and the government, the
DOJ in Marcus took the position in an amicus curiae brief that qui tam
actions should be eliminated because they diluted the DOJ’s authority to
control these cases.
Following the decision, and as defense contractors were mobilizing
the nation’s resources in World War II, Congress amended the FCA,
effectively rendering its qui tam provisions ineffective, by broadly
barring all such actions whenever the government presumably had some
advance knowledge of the fraud when the “suit was brought.”40 This
draconian restriction, sometimes referred to as a “governmental
knowledge” bar, hobbled the FCA,41 because it discouraged potential
34. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863).
35. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991).
36. 317 U.S. 537 (1943), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006), as
recognized in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1894
(2011).
37. Id. at 545.
38. Id. at 540.
39. Id. at 546–47, 552–53.
40. 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (Supp. IV 1943).
41. “This amendment erected what came to be known as a government-knowledge bar:
‘[O]nce the United States learned of a false claim, only the Government could assert its rights
under the FCA against the false claimant.’” Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294 (2010). As a result, the FCA was no longer an
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relators with substantial knowledge of fraud from coming forward when
they could not know what information already existed in the
government’s vast file cabinets.42
In 1984, the government-knowledge bar resulted in the dismissal of
an otherwise valid Medicare fraud case in United States ex rel.
Wisconsin v. Dean,43 a debacle which led the National Association of
Attorneys General to adopt a resolution urging Congress to amend the
FCA to rectify the problem.44 Shortly thereafter, Congress considered
reviving the FCA to address evidence of massive fraud committed by
government defense contractors, who in the 1980s took advantage of
Cold War buildup in national defense spending to line their pockets:
“As had happened during the Civil War, the Congress began receiving
alarming reports of fraud, waste, and abuse”45 including: $400 for
hammers,46 $640 for toilet seats, $660 for ashtrays,47 $7,000 for coffee
pots,48 and $16,571 for a three-cubic-foot refrigerator that the Navy
purchased from defense contractors.49 This combination of poor
procurement practices along with fraud led Congress to revisit the FCA
as a tool to deter and seek redress based upon such conduct.
In 1986, Congress acted to overhaul and to revive the qui tam
provisions of the FCA. By then, four of the largest defense contractors
had been indicted for fraud and a fifth had been convicted, while fortyfive other large contractors were under investigation.50 In addition, the
General Accounting Office had concluded that: “For those who are
caught committing fraud, the chances of being prosecuted and
eventually going to jail are slim. . . . The sad truth is that crime against
the Government often does pay.”51 Congress recognized that by

effective tool against fraud. Id. (“In the years that followed the 1943 amendment, the volume and
efficacy of qui tam litigation dwindled.”).
42. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1997), abrogated by United States ex rel. Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
43. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (1991).
45. Helmer, Jr., supra note 16, at 1271.
46. Id.
47. Mike Ward, It’s Your Information—How a Federal Law Has Turned Citizens into Giant
Slayers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 6, 1996, at H1 (noting that took a Freedom of
Information Act request to “uncover[] the now-famous case of [the] Pentagon’s buying of giltpriced toilet seats . . . .”).
48. Helmer, Jr., supra note 16, at 1271.
49. Id. at 1272.
50. Id.
51. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–27.
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“restricting qui tam suits by individuals who bring fraudulent activity to
the Government’s attention, Congress eliminated the financial incentive
to expose frauds against the Government.”52 So, Congress amended the
FCA to make it a more effective weapon against government fraud.
The Senate report supporting the new legislation pointed out that fraud
in government procurement posed a major problem, and the FCA was
no longer serving its purpose to deter and obtain redress.53 The
“government knowledge” test severely limited FCA actions while fraud
was draining between one and ten percent of the federal budget.54
Congress’ goal was to return the FCA to its purpose of “unleashing a
‘posse of ad hoc deputies as relators to uncover and prosecute frauds
against the government.’”55 Congress’ “overall intent in amending the
qui tam section of the False Claims Act [was] to encourage more private
enforcement suits.”56 Such private suits were perceived as the way to
stem “rising government fraud, especially in the areas of defense
contracting and health care benefits.”57 “In the face of sophisticated
and widespread fraud,” Congress concluded, “only a coordinated effort
of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of
defrauding public funds.”58
To revive the FCA, Congress eliminated the “government
knowledge” bar59 and replaced it with a provision that bars qui tam
cases based upon a prior public disclosure of information by the media
or in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing. Even then, a qui tam
case can proceed if the relator is an “original source” with direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and who voluntarily provides such information to the government
before filing suit.60
This public-disclosure restriction bars qui tam cases that prey on the
efforts of others who have brought the fraud to light, while permitting
52. United States ex rel. Butler v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205
(M.D. Fla. 1999).
53. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13.
54. Id. at 3.
55. United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah, Co., 176 F.3d 776, 778 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d
46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992)).
56. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2–3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288–89.
57. Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1467 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13.
59. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, 507 F.3d 720, 729 (1st Cir. 2007), overruled as
recognized by United States ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Inc., 750 F.3d 111 (1st Cir.
2014). The author of this Article was counsel for Dr. Peter Rost, the former vice president of
marketing at Pfizer, in this case.
60. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2012).
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all other qui tam cases in which relators provide valuable information.61
Logically, such permitted information can be valuable because either
the fraudulent scheme was not previously exposed or because the relator
adds valuable information as a person with first-hand and independent
knowledge of the fraud even if it had already been exposed.62 Congress
also added anti-retaliation and relator attorney fee provisions to the
FCA.63
With these amendments, the FCA sprung back to life. Whereas from
1943 to 1986, the number of cases brought under the FCA averaged
only six per year,64 that number increased almost fifty-fold after the
1986 amendments, such that in the twenty-seven years since then, more
than 9244 cases were brought, an average of more than 300 cases per
year.65 More than seventy percent of such recoveries have come from
qui tam cases bought by relators rather than brought directly on behalf
of the United States by the DOJ.66 Furthermore, recoveries from FCA
cases have skyrocketed from $54 million in 1985, the year before the
amendments, to more than $40 billion in the years since.67 The
deterrent value attributable to qui tam actions though, perhaps, not
quantifiable in monetary terms, is undeniable.68
In 2010, Congress again broadened the FCA’s publicdisclosure/original-source provisions to give the DOJ the discretion to
permit a whistleblower to litigate a case even if there has been a public
disclosure and the whistleblower is not deemed an original source.69
Congress also clarified the original-source exception language so that it

61. United States ex rel. Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
62. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3130(h).
64. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 2:9
(West 2013).
65. Fraud Statistics - Overview: Oct. 2, 1987 - Sept. 30, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://w
ww.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (last
modified Dec. 23, 2013, 2:42 PM).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of
the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 239–318 (1999)
(arguing that the FCA has a beneficial deterrent effect). See generally William E. Kovacic, The
Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (1998) (arguing that the costs of defending against qui tam suits are
built into the price of government contracts, thus diminishing the benefit the government derives
from these lawsuits).
69. As amended, the relevant section now provides that the “court shall dismiss an action or
claim” if there has been a public disclosure “unless opposed by the Government,” or if relator is
deemed by the court to be an original source. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012).
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applies when the relator is the source of substantial information of at
least one element of the fraud.70
B. The For-Profit School Industry
For-profit schools—such as ITT, University of Phoenix, DeVry, and
Ashford University—have grown exponentially in recent years. For
example, the University of Phoenix, with an enrollment exceeding
300,000, is now the largest school in the United States. In contrast,
Pennsylvania State University, one of the largest public state
universities in the United States, has approximately 45,000 students.71
These rapidly growing for-profit schools also have become the target
of congressional and media criticism.72 There are good reasons for this.
The DOE’s statistics show that although students at for-profit, postsecondary schools comprise only about thirteen percent of highereducation students, they account for thirty-one percent of student loans,
and nearly half of loan defaulters.73 And, the amount of their defaulted
loans exceeds “the yearly tuition bill for all students at public two and
four-year colleges and universities.”74 This debt is a huge and growing
national problem that victimizes both taxpayers and students,
70. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
71. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=74 (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (listing the twenty
largest degree-granting colleges and universities in the country).
72. See, e.g., S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS COMM., FOR PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT
SUCCESS (2012), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/Cont
ents.pdf [hereinafter HARKIN REPORT] (discussing federal loans and for-profit education);
Editorial, Lessons of a For-Profit College Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A24; Stephen
Burd, The Subprime Student Racket: With Help from Washington, the For-Profit College is
Loading up Millions of Low-Income Students with Debt They’ll Never Pay Off, WASH.
MONTHLY, Nov./Dec. 2009, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0
911.burd.html (discussing for-profit colleges and federal student loans); Tamar Lewin, Hearing
Sees Financial Success and Education Failures of For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2011, at A17 (discussing hearing on for-profit colleges); David Halperin, New Gainful
Employment Rule Is Weak, But Predatory For-Profit Colleges Remain on the Ropes, REPUBLIC
REP. (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.republicreport.org/2014/new-gainful-employmentrule-is-weak-but-predatory-for-profit-colleges-remain-on-the-ropes (criticizing the Obama
administration’s “gainful employment” rule aimed at student loan abuse by colleges); Danny
Vinik, Obama Is Cracking Down on For-Profit Colleges – And Liberals Should Applaud Him for
It, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117049/white-houseissues-gainful-employment-regulation-profit-colleges.
73. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Obama Administration Takes Action to Protect
Americans from Predatory, Poor-Performing Career Colleges (Mar. 14, 2014), available at http://
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-takes-action-protect-americans-predatory
-poor-performing-ca.
74. Andrew Martin, Debt Collectors Cashing In On Student Loan Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2012, at A1.
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disproportionately those going to for-profit schools. Despite the nondischargeable debt they incur, nearly three-fourths of the for-profit
gainful employment programs analyzed by the DOE in 2014 produced
graduates who, on average, earned no more than high school dropouts.75
That is not all.
Moreover, on July 30, 2012, the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions (“Harkin Committee”)—headed by
recently-retired Iowa Senator Tom Harkin—issued a scathing report
(“Harkin Report”) after concluding a comprehensive, two-year
investigation of the rapidly growing for-profit schools. The Harkin
Report conclusions included the following:
“Federal taxpayers are investing billions of dollars a year, $32 billion in the most
recent year, in companies that operate for-profit colleges. Yet, more than half of the
students who enrolled in those colleges . . . left without a degree or diploma within a
median of four months;”76
“[T]he for-profit colleges examined employed 35,202 recruiters compared with 3,512
career services staff;”77
“The vast majority of the students left with student loan debt that may follow them
throughout their lives, and can create a financial burden that is extremely difficult, and
sometimes impossible, to escape;”78
“For profit colleges are rapidly increasing their reliance on taxpayer dollars. In 2009–
10, the sector received $32 billion, 25 percent of the total Department of Education
student aid program funds;”79
The average tuition for a bachelor’s degree at the for-profit schools was $62,702
compared to $55,522 at private colleges, and for an associate’s degree cost $34,988 at
for-profit schools compared to $8,313 at private colleges;80
Ninety-six percent of for-profit students take out taxpayer-subsidized student loans
compared to thirteen percent of community college students.81

Steve Eisman is an investor whose visionary criticism of the
subprime-mortgage industry was chronicled by Michael Lewis in his
bestselling book The Big Short. “Until recently,” Eisman said in a
much-publicized speech and in testimony for the Harkin Committee, “I
thought that there would never again be an opportunity to be involved
with an industry as socially destructive and morally bankrupt as a
subprime mortgage industry. I was wrong. The for-profit education
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Obama Administration Announces Final Rules to
Protect Students from Poor-Performing Career College Programs (Oct. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-announces-final-rules-protect-stude
nts-poor-performing-career-college-programs.
76. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE
FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND INSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 1 (2012),
available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 7.
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industry has proven equal to the task.”82 Eisman attributes that
industry’s success to influence peddling, watering down of industry
regulations, and the increase in public funding for such schools. “[T]he
government, the students, and the taxpayer bear all of the risk and the
for-profit industry reaps all the rewards,” he said.83 “This is similar to
the subprime mortgage sector.”84
Other striking resemblances between the subprime-mortgage industry
and the for-profit education industry are that both rely upon highpressure, boiler-room-type sales tactics.
Both target poor and
vulnerable citizens, and both exploit the aspirations of these citizens to
realize the American Dream. As a result, both industries have caused
millions of low-income Americans to take on debt that they can ill
afford, often with no benefit to them.85
One striking difference, though, is that the debt that poor people take
on to buy a home is dischargeable through bankruptcy. In contrast, the
huge debt that low-income Americans take on for a for-profit student
loan is non-dischargeable.86 This is true regardless of whether the
person gets a for-profit school degree, much less a job afterward that
would provide a salary sufficient to pay off the loan. As Senator Harkin
pointed out:
The difference between the subprime and this is at least in the
subprime mortgage crisis you could walk away from your home. . . .
These students with these debts cannot walk away from them. . . . So
from a strictly money-making perspective, what I have described is a
highly successful model. But . . . from an educational perspective and
from the perspective of public moneys and disadvantaged students,
from an ethical perspective, I think it is a deeply disturbing model.87

82. Andy Kroll, Eisman’s Next Big Short: For-Profit Colleges, MOTHER JONES (May 27,
2010, 6:55 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2010/05/steve-eisman-big-short-michaellewis.
83. Steve Eisman, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions Testimony of Steven Eisman, SUBPRIME GOES TO COLLEGE 1 (June 24, 2010),
available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Eisman.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (exceptions to debt dischargeable in bankruptcy).
87. Bridgepoint Education, Inc.: A Case Study in For-Profit Education and Oversight,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 112th Cong. 774
(2011). Senator Harkin also noted that:
America was caught off guard by the subprime mortgage crisis. Fast talking sales
people deceived consumers into taking out loans that they knew would never be paid
back and financial speculators hid the risk and passed the debt off to investors. What
has become clear over the past year, through this committee’s investigation, is that
there is a class of subprime colleges within the for-profit sector that are doing the exact
same thing. Instead of packaging these loans into securities and selling them to
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These schools have also targeted low-income minorities.88 And
veterans have been targeted as well, particularly at ITT, according to the
Harkin Committee’s investigation.89 As CNN and Money Magazine
reported in summarizing the committee’s findings in this regard, the “GI
Bill was designed to help veterans, but the biggest beneficiaries seem to
be the for-profit private schools that are raking in taxpayer dollars.”90
To benefit from Pell Grants and other taxpayer-paid or backed
student loans and grants, all the for-profit schools need to do is make
sure the student is enrolled for at least thirty days—which is why the
recruiters’ salaries are often pegged to retaining students in class for
thirty days.91 This is also often all they do, as evidenced by the fact
more than half their students stay in school less than three months,
while those who stay long enough and accumulate the massive nondischargeable debt necessary to get a degree from one of these schools
have worse job prospects than high school dropouts.92
For this and other reasons, the billions of dollars poured into these
schools through student loans raise public policy issues beyond the
scope of this Article.93 Specifically, as demonstrated above, one issue
raised by the Senate Harkin Committee investigation and by the media

investors, this time they are passing the debt off to American taxpayers in the form of
federally guaranteed student loans.
Drowning in Debt: A Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, 112th Cong. 786
(2011).
88. Burd, supra note 72.
89. Aaron Smith, For-Profit Schools Cash In On the GI Bill, CNN MONEY (June 26, 2012,
10:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/26/news/economy/veterans-schools; see For-Profit
Colleges Tap GI Bill Loophole For Business, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 30, 2014), http://w
ww.ibj.com/articles/print/48808-for-profit-colleges-tap-gi-bill-loophole-for-business (“For-profit
colleges, including Carmel-based ITT Educational Services, Inc., accounted for eight of the top
10 recipients of education benefits for U.S. military veterans in the 2012-13 academic year,
according to a U.S. Senate report.”).
90. Id.
91. First-year college students generally have to wait thirty-days for federal student loan
disbursements. See Receiving Aid, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/fafsa/nextsteps/receive-aid (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
92. United States Department of Education, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49, (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/notice-proposed-rulemaking
-march-14-2014.pdf; see HARKIN REPORT, supra note 72, at 535 (discussing the for-profit
educational institution ITT).
93. See generally HARKIN REPORT, supra note 72 (discussing federal investment in for-profit
education). The report of the Harkin Committee raises public and social policy questions as to
whether these schools are a costly blight on American society. This much is clear: Given the
huge marketing budgets, executive salaries, and profit margins for such schools, as well as the
fact that they saddle the American taxpayers and their students with such extraordinary debt, it is
hard to see how such an industry can survive absent strong lobbying efforts and forceful litigation
tactics.
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is the failure of many of these schools to create human capital at the
same time that they destroy enormous real capital paid for by
taxpayers.94 To address this issue and to provide a stepladder to upward
mobility and success to lower- and middle-class persons by providing a
sensible alternative to these for-profit schools, President Obama rolled
out a proposal in his 2015 State of the Union Address to provide free
community college tuition to qualified students.95 The Obama
Administration’s proposal is to make community college free and
universal by reducing community-college tuition costs to zero across the
economic spectrum.96 The plan, based on one developed in Tennessee,
is estimated to cost $60 billion over ten years.97
C. ITT
ITT, a for-profit education corporation with more than 130 locations
nationwide, is one of the nation’s largest companies offering postsecondary educational training.98
All for-profit schools have
astronomically high default rates;99 but, even among this group, ITT
stands out for having worst default rate of for-profit schools
nationwide.100 And, ITT’s high default rate is, in fact, “significantly”
underreported because of deceptive practices ITT deploys to delay and

94. See supra notes 71–92 and accompanying text (discussing the failures of for-profit
education institutions).
95. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Genius of Obama’s Two-Year College Proposal,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 12, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2015/01/the-genius-of-obamas-two-year-college-proposal/384429/ (“‘This proposal would make
two years of college the norm in the way that high school was the norm in the last century,’”
White House domestic policy advisor Cecilia Munoz explained”); Claire Zillman, The Case for
Obama’s State of the Union Free College Proposal, In Six Charts, FORTUNE (Jan. 20, 2015, 9:33
PM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/20/the-case-for-obamas-state-of-the-union-free-college-proposa
l-in-6-charts/ (discussing with six charts Obama’s free college proposal).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ITT is a for-profit
institution with over 140 locations . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Bill Alpert, Clever Is as Clever Does: For-profit Colleges Are Contributing
Mightily to the Country’s $1 Trillion In Student–Loan Debt. When It Comes to Defaults, ITT
Educational Services Is Doing Much More Than its Share, BARRON’S (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB50001424053111904857404577333971078578982;
Kim
Clark, The 5 Colleges that Leave the Most Students Crippled by Debt, TIME (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://time.com/money/3426618/student-loan-default-factories (“Almost 650,000 federal student
loan borrowers have defaulted on their debt, new data shows. A handful of for-profit schools are
a big part of the problem.”).
100. See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 99 (discussing ITT student loan debt); Clark, supra note 99
(noting that ITT’s default rate on loans due in 2011 was the highest of for-profit schools, at about
twenty-two percent).
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quell defaults.101 ITT also has one of the highest costs per course
credit.102
On August 7, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) issued a notification, known popularly as a “Wells Notice,”
informing ITT that the SEC intended to bring an enforcement action
against the company for federal securities-law violations.103 ITT’s
2013 Annual Report, filed in October 2014, revealed additional serious
problems.104 But this was not the first period of time that ITT faced
101. HARKIN REPORT, supra note 72, at 533 (“Default management is primarily accomplished
by putting students who have not made payments on their student loans into temporary
deferments or forbearances.”). In addition:

Two-thirds of ITT’s revenue now comes from taxpayer-funded student loans, and most
of the remainder from taxpayer-funded defense contracts. Id. at 517–18.

ITT was the beneficiary of largely taxpayer-paid loans totaling approximately $1.1
billion in 2010. Id. at 542.

More than half of ITT’s students withdraw from school within three months. Id. at
531.

More than thirty-seven percent of ITT’s revenue in 2010 was profit and more than
nineteen percent was devoted to marketing, the two largest uses of company revenue.
Id. at 520.

It costs close to $45,000 in tuition for an associate’s degree at ITT compared to
approximately $9,000 for an associate’s degree from a community college in the same
area and close to $94,000 for a bachelor’s degree compared to about $43,500 for a
bachelor’s degree in the same area (ITT in Indianapolis v. Indiana University in
Bloomington, Indiana). Id. at 523.

ITT’s student default rate exceeded twenty-five percent, and that default rate was
deceptively low because ITT manipulated the rate by placing students who should have
been in default in forbearance to delay defaults. Id. at 533.

The facts “cast serious doubt on the notion that ITT’s students are receiving an
education that affords them adequate value relative to cost and calls into question the
$1.2 billion investment American taxpayers made” in ITT in 2010. Id. at 542.

Approximately, ninety-five percent of ITT students take out student loans. Alison
Sherry, As For-Profit Colleges Flourish, Focus Turns to Grads’ Success and Debt,
DENVER POST (Jan. 17, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14209838.
102. Id.
103. ITT Educational Services, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30–32 (Dec. 31, 2013),
available at http://app.quotemedia.com/data/downloadFiling?webmasterId=101533&ref=984855
8&type=PDF&symbol=ESI&companyName=ITT+Educational+Services+Inc.&formType=10-K
&dateFiled=2014-10-16. On the eve of this bad news, on August 4, 2014, ITT’s chief executive
officer, Kevin Modany, announced that he would be stepping down from the company. Id. at 37.
104. These included the following problems: The DOJ is investigating ITT for deceptive trade
practices and other wrongdoing as is the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Government
Accountability Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Defense (the other
area from that ITT benefits from government largess). Id. at 30. Attorneys General from
Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington are now
all investigating ITT’s consumer practices, and New Mexico is suing ITT for deceptive practices.
Id. The U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a Civil Investigative Demand on ITT
and in February 2014 filed a complaint in the Southern District of Indiana accusing ITT of
subjecting students to undue influence or coercing them into taking out private education loans.
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close scrutiny.105
D. The FCA and For-Profit Schools
Title IV of the Higher Education Act (“HEA”) governs the
administration of more than $150 billion in annual federal student
financial assistance for higher education.106 Student financial aid under
Title IV comes in two primary forms: grants and loans.107 The Pell
Grant Program—the largest federal grant program—provides grants on
a need-based basis to low-income students.108 These grants do not have
to be repaid.109 Prior to 2010, and during the relevant time period of
Ms. Leveski’s allegations, students received federal loans from two
student loan programs.110
In the first, the Federal Family Education Loan Program, dating back
to the mid-1960s, the federal government would guarantee loans
originated by private lenders against losses from default.111 In the
second, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program, enacted in
Id. One ITT location and 87 programs need to raise its Student Retention Rate and five other
locations and 158 programs need to raise their graduate placement rates to at least sixty percent
by November 1, 2015 or they may lose their accreditation. Id. at 28–29. ITT restated its
unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements for the fiscal quarters ended March 31,
2013, June 30, 2013, and September 30, 2013 (which is an acknowledgement that those financial
statements were false). This was a breach of its contract with a key lender, which could trigger an
acceleration of its payments to the full amount it owes. Id. at 33. ITT failed to submit 2013
audited consolidated financial statements and Compliance Audits to the DOE by June 30, 2014,
and as a result, the DOE determined that ITT’s schools were not financially responsible. Id. at
24.
105. According to a June 30, 2005 10-Q Report that ITT filed with the SEC:
On February 25, 2004, federal agents executed search warrants at our corporate
headquarters and at ten of our 79 ITT Technical Institutes nationwide. On that same
date, our Directors and executive officers and some of our other employees each
received a federal grand jury subpoena that was issued, along with the search warrants,
by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, located in Houston, Texas.
ITT Educational Services, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 24 (June 30, 2005). According
to ITT, that investigation was dropped, without any charges made against the company or its
executives, on or about June 24, 2005. Id. ITT SEC filings say little about what led to this
criminal investigation or what led to its abandonment more than a year after the issuance of these
search warrants.
106. Federal Student Aid: About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/about (last
visited Apr. 26, 2015).
107. Anthony J. Guida Jr & David Figuli, Higher Education’s Gainful Employment and 90/10
Rules: Unintended “Scarlet Letters” for Minority, Low-Income, and Other at-Risk Students, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 133 (2012).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Deborah Lucas & Damien Moore, Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of
Student Loans, in MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 163, 165 (Deborah
Lucas ed., 2010).
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1994, the government directly lent money to qualifying students.112
Congress ended the guaranteed loan program in 2010 and replaced it
with direct federal student loans starting July 1, 2010.113
After the enormous sums of money now administered under the HEA
led to abuses,114 Congress became concerned that “recruiters [of
students for institutions of higher education] paid by the head are
tempted to sign up poorly qualified students who will derive little
benefit . . . and may be unable or unwilling to repay federal guaranteed
loans.”115 As a result, in 1992, Congress amended Title IV to prohibit
institutions receiving federal financial assistance from “provid[ing] any
commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or
indirectly on success in securing enrollments or financial aid to any
persons or entities engaged in any student recruiting or admission
activities or in making decisions regarding the award of student
financial assistance.”116
Seeking to maneuver around this prohibition, in 2001, the for-profit
education industry lobbied Congress to enact legislation that stated that
the incentive-compensation ban would not apply when recruiters
receive “a fixed compensation that is paid regularly for services and that
is adjusted no more frequently than every six months.”117 This
legislation was buried in a bill misleadingly called “The Internet Equity
and Education Act of 2001,” which passed in the House of
Representatives on October 10, 2001, but never got to a floor vote in the
Senate after the bill was referred, on September 21, 2001, to Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.118
112. Id.
113. See Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher
Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 484 n.111 (2012) (discussing the loan program).
114. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.
2013).
115. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2012).
117. H.R. 1992, 107th Cong. § 4(a) (2001).
118. Representative Patsy Mink, the chief opponent of the legislation in the House of
Representatives, pointed out on the House floor at the time that:
This is not a debate about distance learning, it is not a debate about how important
laptop education is in terms of allowing people to participate in the higher education
field at home, safe in their own homes, or in their offices. What this debate is about is
whether the Congress is going to live up to its responsibilities to protect the financial
integrity of the student loan program. That is all this is about. Members will recall in
the late 1980s and in the 1990s there were these tremendous reports from the education
institutions about huge, crescendoing default rates. . . . Congress said, this cannot be.
We must do something to protect the taxpayers from having to pay out all of these
loans that the students were defaulting. So the Congress wisely put into effect three
very important rules: One, that the institutions first had to be accredited, and that they

LABATON PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/27/2015 2:28 PM

The Seventh Circuit Reinvigorates the False Claims Act

833

The for-profit industry, however, then lobbied the DOE, which
oversees these schools, to adopt a regulation to permit institutions
receiving federal financial assistance to pay student recruiters and
financial aid officers “fixed compensation . . . as long as that
compensation is not adjusted up or down more than twice during any
twelve month period, and any adjustment is not based solely on the
number of students recruited, admitted, enrolled, or awarded financial
aid.”119
The industry’s lobbying of DOE paid off handsomely with the
adoption of this regulation by the DOE in 2002.120 The government
official who shepherded this “safe harbor” provision through the DOE
was Sally Stroup, the Assistant Secretary for the Office of
Postsecondary Education at the DOE from 2002–2006.121 Before that,
she served as the lobbyist for the University of Phoenix, and she is now
the Executive Vice President for Government Relations and General
Counsel of the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities,
the lobbying group for the for-profit schools.122 As is clear from
Leveski, the for-profit school industry has also deployed extraordinarily

could offer only 50 percent of their programs off campus . . . . The other rule was that
there had to be 12 hours of instructional offerings in order to be considered a full-time
student. The third was to prevent all those hoaxes that were going on where people
were being paid commissions to recruit students to sign up for higher education
courses, and this exacerbated the default situation. . . . So we are here today with
legislation which will, in essence, repeal those three very important pieces of protective
legislation that were added in 1992 and strengthened in 1998.
147 Cong. Rec. H64630-H6487 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2001) (statement of Rep. Mink),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-10-10/html/CREC-2001-10-10-pt1PgH6463-6.htm. The rule, known as the 50/50 rule, was jettisoned in 2006 as a result of the
Higher Education Reconciliation Act. See Tiffany Stanley, On For-Profit Colleges,
Congress Gets Schooled – Again, THE NEW REPUBLIC (October 12, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/78333/profit-colleges-congress-gets-schoo
led%E2%80%94again (discussing Senate hearings on for-profit schools).
119. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(A) (2002).
120. Id. The lobbying power of this interest group has grown enormously. See, e.g., Sam
Dillon, Online Colleges Receive a Boost from Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/01/national/01educ.html?pagewanted=print (discussing the
growth of the power of this lobby).
121. See ANDREW P. KELLY, AM. ENTER. INST., MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: THE POLITICS
OF FOR-PROFITS IN EDUCATION 8 (2011) (discussing Stroup’s role in shaping for-profit school
policy); Burd, supra note 72 (noting Stroup’s previous role as a lobbyist at the University of
Phoenix, where she worked to largely take the teeth out of regulations designed to cut down on
abuses); David Halperin, New For-Profit Lobbyist Is Long-Time Champion of Troubling Policies,
REPUBLIC REP. (July 6, 2012) (describing Stroup’s role in sheparding through the “safe harbor”
provision). Ms. Stroup was an advocate for the for-profit schools in other ways while serving at
the DOE. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 120 (discussing Stroup’s role in overseeing a program that
eliminated certain funding restrictions for for-profit schools).
122. Halperin, supra note 121.
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aggressive and heavy-handed litigation tactics to frighten
whistleblowers, coerce lawyers, and thereby protect its lucrative
business by shielding itself from accountability.
Although this industry has grown rapidly,123 it also has suffered
several setbacks. For example, in 2011 the DOE eliminated the 2002
regulation after determining it was misused by the for-profit schools to
circumvent Congress’ prohibition on paying recruiters directly or
indirectly based on the number of students they recruited.124 Moreover,
court decisions have allowed private enforcement to step in where the
government regulators have looked away. Beginning in 2005, in United
States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University,125 the Seventh Circuit
held for the first time that recruiting practices that tempt schools to
enroll poorly qualified students can form the basis of an FCA action.126
This groundbreaking decision was based on the restrictions placed on
schools that receive funding from federal student financial assistance
programs by the HEA.127
Following Main, United States ex. rel. Hendow v. University of
Phoenix held that a school’s material breach of its PPA conditions will
give rise to an FCA action.128 A relator bringing such an action,
however, would still need to allege particular facts establishing that the
school illegally compensated its recruiters.129
In the archetypal FCA action, such as where a private company
overcharges under a government contract, the claim for payment is itself
literally false or fraudulent.130 But the FCA is not limited to just false
or fraudulent claims for payment. It also imposes liability for false
statements in support of false claims131 and stretching beyond that it is
“intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might
result in financial loss to the Government.”132 The principles embodied
123. HARKIN REPORT, supra note 72, at 516.
124. Eric Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, For-Profit Lobby Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES
Dec. 10, 2011, at A1; Program Integrity Issues: Incentive Compensation, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC.
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2009/compensation.html.
The DOE’s regulations now flatly prohibit institutions receiving federal award money from
adjusting the salaries of student recruiters and financial aid officers “based in any part, directly or
indirectly, upon success in securing enrollments or the award of financial aid.” 34 C.F.R. §
668.14(b)(22)(ii)(A) (2014).
125. 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. Id. at 916.
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
128. United States ex. rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1170.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968). In amending the FCA in
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in this broad construction of a “false or fraudulent claim” have given
rise to two doctrines that attach potential FCA liability to claims for
payment that are not explicitly and/or independently false themselves:
false certification (either express or implied) and promissory fraud.133
Under either doctrine, if liability could be established based on a forprofit school’s recruitment compensation practices, the FCA damages
stemming from liability would be monumental, constituting a threat to
that company’s survival.134
To receive federal financial assistance—funneled to the schools
through student loans and tuition paid almost exclusively through
taxpayer-financed Pell Grants, Stafford loans, and other student loans or
grants—institutions of higher education regularly must certify their
compliance with multiple federal laws and regulations.135
By
submitting PPAs, all of these schools certify that they are in compliance
with Congress’ ban on directly or indirectly compensating their
recruiters based on the number of students they recruit.136 These PPAs
directly incorporate Congress’ statutory language explicitly “directly
and indirectly” banning such incentive compensation.137 These PPAs
also require that such institutions cannot pay financial aid
representatives based on the loans they help secure.138
Federal subsidies under the HEA require two phases of paperwork.
In phase one, the school submits a PPA to establish its eligibility to
participate in federally subsidized student loan, grant, and scholarship
programs. Both a statute139 and a regulation140 condition a school’s
eligibility on the school’s commitment to refrain from paying recruiters
contingent fees for enrolling students. “The concern is that recruiters
paid by the head are tempted to sign up poorly qualified students who
will derive little benefit from the subsidy and may be unable or
unwilling to repay federally guaranteed loans.”141 In phase two, the

1986, Congress emphasized that the scope of false or fraudulent claims should be broadly
construed to include “each and every claim submitted under a contract, loan guarantee, or other
agreement which was originally obtained by means of false statements or other corrupt or
fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable regulation, constitutes a false
claim.” S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274.
133. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170–71.
134. Id. at 1170.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (2012).
139. Id.
140. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2014).
141. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
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loan or grant applications are actually packaged by the schools and
submitted by the schools and their students. 142
In United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.,143 a
Texas district court dismissed an FCA case after finding that ITT had
not deceived the government in submitting certification documents to
the DOE.144 That judge reasoned that because the DOE’s certification
at issue did not require that ITT forfeit any money it received if it failed
to certify compliance, and payments to ITT were not expressly
conditioned on that certification, no false claims could be made out.145
In addition, because ITT had publicly stated that it was uncertain that it
was complying with recruiting compensation requirements—as opposed
to saying it was complying when it was not—the relators in that case,
and from that earlier pre-Leveski timeframe, were not able to show that
ITT at that time intentionally made false statements to the DOE.146
Accordingly the court found no fraud in the inducement or fraud via a
false certification.147
In breaking new ground in Main, Judge Easterbrook parted from this
logic and held that if the defendant, Oakland University, “knew about
the rule” and nevertheless still told the DOE that “it would comply,
while planning to do otherwise,” then it was liable for false claims.148
Thus, Main established that schools that directly or indirectly
compensate recruiters on the basis of the number of students they recruit
could face FCA liability based on the doctrine of promissory. Judge
Easterbrook put it this way:
To prevail in this suit [relator] must establish that the University not
only knew . . . that contingent fees to recruiters are forbidden, but also
planned to continue paying those fees while keeping the Department
of Education in the dark. This distinction is commonplace in private
law: failure to honor one’s promise is (just) breach of contract, but
making a promise that one intends not to keep is fraud. . . . [I]f the
University knew about the rule and told the Department that it would
comply, while planning to do otherwise, it is exposed to penalties
under the False Claims Act.149

Following Main, in Hendow, the Ninth Circuit held that a relator can
bring an FCA action when a school directly or indirectly compensates
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 502 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503–04.
Id.
United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
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its recruiters based on the number of students they recruit, for the same
reasoning as Judge Easterbrook did in Main and for the additional
reason that the case passed the Circuit’s false certification test.150
These holdings adhere to the text of the FCA, which prohibits all
false claims for public money whether or not accompanied by an
express false statement.151 Different courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
have held that a claim under the FCA can be false when a party merely
falsely certifies compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition to
government payment.152
In Hendow, the relators alleged that the defendant, the University of
Phoenix, violated the FCA because, while knowing that it was ineligible
for Pell Grant Funds based on its violation of the incentive
compensation ban, the school nonetheless submitted requests for such
funds to the DOE anyway.153 This resulted in a direct and illegal
transfer of government-insured students’ Pell Grant funds into the
school account.154
Main and Hendow are squarely in line with the FCA, which allows
the DOJ and relators to bring cases based not only on false claims, but
also based on false statements that cause claims to be fraudulent.155
These decisions also align with the legislative history of the FCA, in
which Congress stated its intention that the FCA reaches “all fraudulent
attempts to cause the Government to pay our sums of money.”156
Moreover, both decisions are by settled FCA case law holding that
“Congress wrote [the FCA] expansively, meaning ‘to reach all types of
fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government.’”157
Potential FCA liability can be enormous. In 2009, the Apollo Group
Inc. agreed to pay $78.5 million to settle Hendow.158 And in 2011, the
DOJ, which sat largely on the sidelines after lawsuits were brought by
whistleblowers against ITT and other schools in the for-profit school
150. United States ex. rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1172–74 (9th Cir.
2006).
151. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
152. Id. at 1171.
153. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1169.
154. Id. at 1170.
155. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(A)–(B).
156. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274.
157. Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003) (quoting United
States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)).
158. Cary O’Reilly & Daniel Golden, Apollo Settles University of Phoenix Recruiting Suit,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2009, 6:45 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=a7cFhPKPB1mA.
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industry, along with California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana, brought “a
multibillion-dollar” FCA lawsuit against the Education Management
Corporation, “charging that it was not eligible for the $11 billion in state
and federal financial aid it had received from July 2003 through June
2011” because of recruiter fraud violations.159 In describing that
lawsuit, the New York Times reported: “While the civil lawsuit is one of
many raising similar charges against the expanding for-profit college
industry, the case is the first in which the government intervened to
back whistleblowers’ claims that a company consistently violated
federal law by paying recruiters based on how many students it
enrolled.”160
The FCA applies to “any request or demand . . . for money or
property” where the government provides any portion of the money or
property to the “contractor, grantee, or other recipient” or if the
government will “reimburse such contractor, grantee or other recipient
for any portion of the money or property.”161 Thus, when borrowers
default on federally insured loans procured by fraud, FCA liability can
include the defaulted loan amount as well as treble damages imposed
under the FCA and statutory penalties of up to $11,000 for each false
statement made.162
E. The Allegations in United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT
Ms. Leveski worked at ITT’s location in Troy, Michigan from 1996
to 2007.163 In 2007, after she left, she brought a qui tam action in the
Southern District of Indiana at Indianapolis, near the company’s
Carmel, Indiana headquarters.164 She alleged two ways in which ITT
knowingly submitted false claims to the DOE to receive funding from
federal student financial assistance programs. First, she alleged that
ITT falsely purported to pay its recruiters based on a host of factors
while it actually paid them directly or indirectly based on the number of
students recruited.165 Second, she alleged that it paid Financial Aid
Administrators (“FAAs”) based on the number of loans they
packaged.166 Both practices are illegal under the HEA, which was

159. Tamar Levin, For-Profit College Group Sued as U.S. Lays Out Wide Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2011, at A1.
160. Id.
161. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2012).
162. Id. § 3729(g).
163. Leveski, 719 F.2d at 819.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 822.
166. Id. at 823.
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enacted in 1965 “[t]o strengthen the educational resources of our
colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students
in postsecondary and higher education.”167
Ms. Leveski alleged two categories of payments covered by the FCA:
guaranteed loans and direct student grants.168
Under the now-defunct Federal Family Education Loan Program, a
federally guaranteed school loan program in effect during the time
covered by Ms. Leveski’s action, a participating institution that has
entered into a PPA—such as ITT—and an eligible student submit an
application to a private lender for a loan on behalf of the student.169
The lender—typically a bank—issues a check for tuition, made payable
to both the student and the institution, for the student to use to pay
tuition.170 The DOE subsidizes interest payments on the loans during
the period that the student is actively enrolled in classes and during
certain grace periods.171
The loans are guaranteed by state agencies or nonprofit organizations
and are both subsidized and reinsured by the DOE.172 If a student
defaults, the guaranteeing agency or organization must reimburse the
lender for any balance due and could then try to collect any unpaid
amount due from the student.173 If that agency were unsuccessful in
such collection efforts, then the DOE would have to reimburse the
guaranteeing agency for the loss or accept assignment of the loan.174
Thus, the federal government would often have to pay out-of-pocket
when students defaulted on loan payments for these federally
guaranteed loans.
Ms. Leveski also alleged that ITT received funds directly through the
federal Pell Grant Program.175 Only institutions that enter into a PPA
may receive Pell Grant funds to disburse to its eligible students.176 The

167. Higher Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89–329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965).
168. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 839.
169. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, 639 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Under
the FFELP, DOEd pays claims submitted by eligible private lenders for interest-rate subsidies and
special allowances granted on behalf of student borrowers.”).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(1)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.400(b)(3), 682.404, 682.409(a)(1)
(2014).
175. Leveski, 719 F.2d at 823.
176. See United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 496 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (explaining that institutions may not receive Pell Grant funds unless they enter into a
PPA).
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participating school requests funds from the DOE to pay for grants for
eligible students.177 Those funds are then deposited in an institutional
account, to be held in trust for the intended student beneficiaries.178
The student prepares an application for a Pell Grant, which the student
may submit directly to the DOE or give to the school to transmit.179
As discussed above, if ITT “knew about the rule” prohibiting the
payment of incentive compensation to recruiters and told the DOE that
“it would comply, while planning to do otherwise,”180 ITT would face
liability under the FCA. In this situation, ITT could be held liable for
up to treble damages under the FCA for all, or some portion of, both its
direct Pell Grants and for all, or some portion of its federally guaranteed
student loans. ITT could also be held liable for penalties—under the
FCA—of up to $11,000 for each false claim or statement in support of a
claim that it made. This does not include substantial FCA damages and
penalties that could flow from establishing liability based on her loanpackaging fraud allegations, which she alleged violated the FCA.
Ms. Leveski’s employment at ITT’s Troy, Michigan campus began
on January 8, 1996,181 before the adoption of the 2002 DOE
regulations. The federal statute and DOE regulation prohibiting the
direct or indirect compensation of recruiters and financial aid
representatives based on their numbers were effective for the entire
period of time covered by her lawsuit. ITT initially hired Ms. Leveski
as a recruiter, referred to by ITT as an “Inside Recruitment
Representative.”182 She alleged that throughout her employment, ITT
made the importance of recruiting “numbers” very clear.183 Recruiters
were told “that if they wanted an increase in pay, they must increase
applications, enrollments, and starts.”184 Starts are important because,
as mentioned, students need to remain in school for thirty days for their
federal student loans to vest and the school to become the beneficiary of
such funds.185
Although ITT’s focus was always on recruiting “numbers,” according
177. Id.
178. 34 C.F.R. § 668.161(b).
179. See Microtech Tech. Inst. v. Riley, 139 F.3d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining the
rules regarding the Pell Grant program).
180. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2005).
181. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2013).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 821.
184. Id.
185. First-year college students generally have to wait thirty days for federal student loan
disbursements. See Receiving Aid, supra note 91. At ITT, more than half of enrolled students
drop out within three months. HARKIN REPORT, supra note 72, at 577.
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to Ms. Leveski’s lawsuit, it pretended to evaluate recruiters based on
multiple criteria, including professional development, the attrition rate
of enrolled students, “being a team player,” appearance, and attitude.186
Ms. Leveski alleged that these values rose and fell in tandem with her
recruiting numbers.187 Her success in recruiting students correlated
with her alleged success in ITT’s other job-evaluation criteria.188 The
other non-quantifiable and easily manipulated criteria masked the fact
that ITT was directly and indirectly compensating ITT’s recruiters
based on the number of students they recruited in violation of the HEA,
thereby subjecting ITT to FCA liability.
Ms. Leveski was a recruiter for six years, and after that, a Financial
Aid Administer (“FAA”) for close to five years.189 During this time190
she learned that FAA pay was related almost exclusively to the number
of student loans the FAA processed,191 demonstrating that “ITT only
cared about how much federal financial assistance award money she
could secure for the school and how quickly she could do it.”192 This
pressure to meet loan package goals and secure federal funds as quickly
as possible led FAAs “to underreport students’ incomes, to overlook
discrepancies in the students’ applications, and even to falsify financial
aid documents.”193
Ms. Leveski filed her FCA case on July 3, 2007, and she detailed in
her complaint specific evidence that led her to reach her conclusions.194
While the complaint remained under seal, the United States Attorney’s
Office in Indianapolis investigated the claims but declined to
intervene.195 The case was then unsealed and, as permitted by the FCA,
Ms. Leveski’s lawyers then began litigating it.
F. The District Court’s Holding
Judge William T. Lawrence initially presided over Ms. Leveski’s
case.196 He quickly denied a motion to dismiss based on ITT’s
argument that the case was “substantially similar” to United States ex
rel. Graves v. ITT and, therefore, should be barred on the basis of an
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id.
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FCA first-to-file bar.197 Similar to the public-disclosure bar, the firstto-file bar prevents a relator from bringing claims when a similar case
has already been filed.198 Courts disagree on whether the first-to-file
bar “kills” the latter case or merely requires it to stand in line and await
disposition of the earlier case.199
Judge Lawrence avoided the question by holding—as the Seventh
Circuit later also held in addressing the public-disclosure issue—that
Ms. Leveski’s lawsuit was not similar to the earlier Graves case.200
After largely denying ITT’s second motion to dismiss, Judge Lawrence
set a schedule for the case to move forward.201 Although ITT argued
that Ms. Leveski’s allegations were not particular enough to meet
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirements, Judge
Lawrence found they were detailed enough for the case to proceed
forward, though he did limit the time period of the case from 2001–
2007 based on the FCA’s six-year statute of limitation.202
But then the case was transferred on June 10, 2010 to Judge Tanya
Walton Pratt,203 a newly appointed district court judge. Shortly
thereafter, ITT filed a third motion to dismiss in which it argued that the
case was barred because: a) it was “based upon publicly disclosed
allegations” in the earlier Graves case and b) Ms. Leveski was “not the
original source of her allegations.”204
ITT’s “new” argument was a repeat of the one it lost on first-to-file
grounds with two differences. The two differences were: first, that ITT
now based its argument on the public-disclosure bar instead of the first197. Id. at 825.
198. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
199. That issue will be decided by the Supreme Court in 2015 on appeal from United States ex
rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2013). The view that the latter case merely
forces the second filer to wait in line is consistent with the idea that the bar is designed to
encourage relators to come forward quickly and also to avoid confusion as to who should be the
point person for the litigation. That view is more in line with the statutory language and
legislative history of the FCA. See, e.g., Halliburton, 710 F.3d at 183 (holding that the first-tofile bar merely makes the second filer wait in line); In re Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig.,
566 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the first-to-file bar “makes more sense within
the overall structure of the FCA”). In 2014, the Supreme Court took certiorari on this issue and
an unrelated jurisdictional issue. The DOJ supports the wait-in-line argument. In United States
ex rel. Shea v. Cellco Partnership, Inc., 748 F.3d 338, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the District of
Columbia Circuit took the position that first-to-file bar permanently blocks cases. Judge Sri
Srinivasan, however, dissented and pointed out that the FCA and its legislative history clearly
support a “wait-in-line” approach. Id. at 349 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
200. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 829.
201. Id. at 825–26.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 826.
204. Id.
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to-file bar; and second, after years of litigation, ITT now argued that it
had elicited “new evidence” on the basis of Ms. Leveski’s deposition
testimony that ostensibly supported its argument.205
Judge Pratt dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.206 In doing so, she
held that Ms. Leveski’s allegations were publicly disclosed by Graves,
and that she was not an original source.207 Thereafter, acting on a
motion from ITT and claiming to be using her own inherent authority,
Judge Pratt then issued sanctions amounting to $394,998.33 against the
law firms representing Ms. Leveski for pursuing what the Judge viewed
as a frivolous case and against one of her lawyers, whom she accused of
“pluck[ing] a plaintiff out of thin air and tr[ying] to manufacture a
lucrative case.”208
In granting the dismissal motion, Judge Pratt noted that, like Ms.
Leveski, the relators in Graves worked as ITT recruiters and also
“alleged that ITT violated the HEA by compensating its admissions and
recruitment representatives based directly on the number of their
enrolled students.”209 Judge Pratt relied on Glaser v. Wound Care
Consultants, Inc., in which the Seventh Circuit held that the addition of
“a few allegations” in a complaint not covered by the previous
disclosure is not enough to take the case outside the public-disclosure
bar.210
It did not matter to the district court that Ms. Leveski alleged a
different recruiting-fraud scheme than was alleged in Graves—a scheme
designed to camouflage the type of misconduct alleged in Graves—or
that the scheme she alleged spanned a later and greater period of time,
or that she also alleged violations of FAA requirements absent from
Graves.
Decisive for Judge Pratt was that both lawsuits alleged ITT violated
recruiting fraud law.211 Judge Pratt also expressed concern that, before
205. Id.
206. Id. at 826–27.
207. Id. at 827. At the time, the public-disclosure bar was a jurisdictional bar, but since then
the law changed it so that it no longer remained a jurisdictional bar. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)
(2012).
208. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 819. In making the first holding, the Judge misinterpreted publicdisclosure law. With regard to the original-source portion of her opinion, Judge Pratt
acknowledged that controlling Seventh Circuit law supported Ms. Leveski’s position, but held
that she nonetheless, as district court judge, had discretion to ignore controlling circuit law. The
Seventh Circuit overturned these sanctions.
209. Id. at 827.
210. Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2009); see
United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00867-TWP, 2011 WL
3471071, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011) (noting the dismissal order).
211. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 826.
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speaking with a lawyer, Ms. Leveski might not have fully appreciated
the legal implications of the Main decision as it related to the PPAs that
ITT’s CEO signed and provided to the DOE.212 Thus, Ms. Leveski’s
lawsuit was thrown out (and her lawyers were sanctioned) because she
supposedly lacked the legal acumen and FCA background to be fully
versed in the theory of liability that Chief Circuit Judge Easterbrook
established in Main. The district court ignored the fact that Ms.
Leveski, a layperson with knowledge of all pertinent frauds, was not
required to know the exceedingly complex legal significance of these
facts.
Holding that Ms. Leveski needed to have expert knowledge of the
contents and legal significance of the PPAs made no sense because
federal compensation laws required ITT to provide the DOE with
signed PPAs. So, the government obviously knew that ITT promised in
those PPAs to abide by federal incentive compensation law; the
government did not need Ms. Leveski to tell it what those laws were or
what promises ITT made. What the government does need for the FCA
to be effective is a whistleblower able to provide information that the
government does not know. Ms. Leveski provided such information
based on her personal experience as an ITT insider: she gave the
government information based on her personal knowledge and
experience that the government did not already know, demonstrating
that ITT violated the law while masking its actual recruitercompensation practices. The district court, however, would have
required Ms. Leveski to know about ITT’s PPAs and would have
required her to understand the legal implications of ITT’s signing these
documents—information that the government was fully aware of on its
own. Ms. Leveski, however, disclosed valuable details of ITT’s actual
fraudulent conduct, the very thing that the government needs
whistleblowers to do.
The FCA also does not require that relators know every document
pertaining to the fraud along with the legal significance of such
documents. If it did, that standard would unduly limit potential
whistleblowers mainly to persons who design and orchestrate massive
frauds and/or by virtue of their high company positions are the primary
beneficiaries of such conduct. These are the least likely persons to blow
any whistles. Such a requirement would also greatly increase the
uncertainty of litigation, thereby discouraging relators from coming

212. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs. Inc., No. 1:07-CV-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 266943, at *4–6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012) (ordering on motion to alter or amend the
judgment).

LABATON PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/27/2015 2:28 PM

The Seventh Circuit Reinvigorates the False Claims Act

845

forward and undermining the objectives of the FCA.
Left standing, the district court opinion would have had a pernicious
and chilling effect on the FCA, making it virtually impossible for
relators to bring cases who are not top-level corporate insiders or
persons with legal knowledge or who have access to company contracts
that the government already knew about. Such a construction of the
public-disclosure bar would immunize companies, particularly those
that change their fraud scheme frequently to avoid detection or
compartmentalize their fraud among numerous employees or offices.
The Seventh Circuit did not let this happen.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Ms. Leveski’s lawyers filed timely notices of appeal to the dismissal
and sanction’s orders.213 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court, ruling in Ms. Leveski’s favor on three important issues.
First, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the FCA’s public-disclosure
bar should not be construed to bar a valid FCA case against ITT simply
because the school had earlier been subject to a separate FCA lawsuit
involving—a superficially similar, but in fact vastly different—fraud
scheme from years earlier. Building on precedent, the Seventh Circuit
held that to trigger the public-disclosure bar, the publicly disclosed
fraud schemes should be substantially the same as the scheme alleged
by the later relator.214 Thus, it was not enough that the same defendant,
ITT, was sued in both cases because the fraud schemes alleged in each
case radically differed. The Seventh Circuit’s rationale is clear:
applying the public-disclosure bar at a high level of generality
eliminates valid qui tam cases and discourages whistleblowers from
coming forward, an effect antithetical to the purposes of the FCA.
The Seventh Circuit also recognized that a prior public disclosure of
one ITT fraudulent scheme did not inform the government that the
company replaced that scheme with another more sophisticated and
deceptive one.215 After the 2002 change in the applicable regulations,
ITT quietly adopted a new scheme designed to mask ITT’s illegal
conduct.216 This scheme went on until Ms. Leveski blew the whistle.217
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that because the newer lawsuit did not
disclose the identical scheme exposed earlier, the public-disclosure bar

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Leveski, 719 F.3d at 828.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 825.
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would not block Ms. Leveski’s lawsuit.218
This makes sense. After all, if there were no public disclosure of the
fraud scheme at issue, then the whistleblower’s information is valuable
because the lawsuit informs the government about a scheme of which it
was not previously aware.
Under these circumstances, the
whistleblower’s lawsuit cannot be parasitic. Because it exposed a
previously unknown fraud scheme and a new basis for corporate
liability, Leveski could not have been brought based on the previously
filed lawsuit.
Second, the FCA’s public-disclosure bar is limited by an originalsource exception, a “savings clause,” that is also designed to encourage
bona fide whistleblowing. Based on this original-source exception,
even if there has been an earlier public disclosure, a relator can still
pursue a lawsuit, so long as the relator can show she provided valuable
original information to add to that disclosure.219 There are good
reasons to encourage original sources to come forward even when there
has been a public disclosure. For example, the relator’s substantial or
eyewitness information can be more valuable than the information
underlying the public disclosure, which might be nothing more than
rumors.220
As mentioned, the district court would have largely and unduly
limited the universe of potential whistleblowers to top-level company
officials or those persons who design fraud schemes. The district
court’s ruling, if upheld, would have severely eroded the FCA because
such high-level executives are the very persons, as chief beneficiaries of
fraud or most at risk for civil and criminal liability as result of the fraud,
that are least likely to blow any whistles.
Moreover, based on the district court’s misguided interpretation of
the FCA, even high-level officials who were not legal scholars (or
lawyers) could be barred from being relators. Significantly, overruling
the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that a relator can qualify as
an original source without being a high-level corporate executive and
without being required to have detailed knowledge of the law.221
Rather, the relator need only be knowledgeable of the critical facts
concealed by the fraudsters; as the Seventh Circuit found with Ms.
218. Id. at 836.
219. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
220. See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 472 (2007) (“To bar a
relator with direct and independent knowledge of information underlying his allegations just
because no one can know what information underlies the similar allegations of some other person
simply makes no sense.”).
221. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 839.
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Leveski, a recruiter and loan packager at ITT.222 The implication of the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion, consistent with the FCA, is that a relator
need only know critical, relevant facts.
Third, the Seventh Circuit warded off ITT’s effort to make Ms.
Leveski and her lawyers an example to intimidate future whistleblowers
and coerce their lawyers. Without any legal or factual basis, as the
Seventh Circuit found, ITT sought to punish Ms. Leveski and her
lawyers by demanding a whopping $4.7 million in sanctions against the
lawyers and Ms. Leveski, collectively and individually.223 By seeking
such sanctions, ITT intended to send a chilling message to those brave
enough to challenge its conduct: Initiate an FCA case against us, and we
will come after you personally.
While the district court abetted such conduct on the part of ITT,224
the Seventh Circuit overturned the sanctions and upon remand ordered
that the case be re-assigned to a new judge.225 In addressing the role of
lawyers in FCA litigation, the Seventh Circuit held that the reputed
solicitation that occurred was not a basis to impose sanctions. A
different decision, affirming the district court, would have severely
deterred potential whistleblowers from coming forward, thwarting
Congress’ intent of encouraging them to report such fraudulent conduct.
Instead, relying on well-settled Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that experienced lawyers are essential to litigating
FCA cases.226
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion formally addressed the issues of
public-disclosure law, original-source law, and the law governing
222. Id.
223. See Relator’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions
at 1–2, United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00867 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
29, 2011), ECF No. 271 (including individual sanctions against one attorney who worked on the
case for a total of less than ten minutes).
224. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794, at *7 (D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012). The ostensible basis for this sanctions’ order
was that even though she was a source of all relevant facts, Ms. Leveski, a lay witness, did not
understand the legal basis for her FCA action until she either did her own research or talked with
a lawyer. This was odd because the case was predicated on a sophisticated legal theory advanced
by Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook after an earlier court found no such legal basis to
predicate an FCA lawsuit. Thus, Ms. Leveski and her lawyers were to be penalized because she,
as a layperson with no legal training, lacked the legal knowledge of one of the nation’s most
renowned judges or lacked the acumen of a practicing FCA lawyer. The factual record upon
which the district court issued sanctions was never clear on this point, and the court had imposed
those sanctions without a hearing and without providing other due process.
225. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 840.
226. Indeed, because a relator is essentially representing the government in a legal action, the
FCA forbids whistleblowers from proceeding pro se in such cases as United States ex rel. Lu. v.
Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2004).
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solicitation by lawyers of clients in that order. This Article does the
same.
A. Public Disclosure
In the public-disclosure section of its opinion, the Seventh Circuit
first analyzed whether Ms. Leveski’s allegations were “substantially
similar” enough to Graves to trigger the public-disclosure bar.227 The
Seventh Circuit decided that although both lawsuits alleged that ITT
had violated the HEA by illegally paying incentive compensation to
recruiters, that similarity was not enough to trigger the public-disclosure
bar.228 The Seventh Circuit held that there were multiple reasons for
this.
First, both cases covered different time periods where there was little
temporal overlap, with Graves covering 1993–1999 and Leveski
covering 1996–2006.229 Second, where Graves only made allegations
about the one department—the recruiting office—Ms. Leveski’s lawsuit
included ITT’s illegal practices in a second entirely different office
division: the financial aid office.230 She alone alleged that the FAAs’
salaries “were directly tied” to how much financial aid FAAs’
secured.231
Third, even setting aside Ms. Leveski’s additional
allegations about the Financial Aid office, the Seventh Circuit saw
“significant differences in her allegations about the recruiting office.”232
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, recognized that Ms. Leveski’s
recruiting fraud allegations differed significantly from Graves.
Whereas Graves concerned overt payments to recruiters for each
student recruited of either five or ten percent “of earned revenue” per
recruit (depending on the recruiters status at ITT), Leveski’s involved a
subtler, more difficult to detect violation of compensation
requirements.233 She alleged that ITT pretended to compensate its
recruiters based on five different factors, some of which were not
quantifiable—including “appearance, attitude, and participation in
continuing education classes”—when in reality the recruiters’ salaries
actually tracked to their recruiting numbers.234
The complaint alleged that in order to deceive the DOE, ITT
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Leveski, 719 F.3d at 829.
Id.
Id. at 829–30.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 830–32.
Id. at 830.
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pretended to be in compliance with the HEA safe harbor when it was, in
fact, not at all. It also alleged that ITT had replaced the previous fraud
scheme described in Graves with a new one that masked its actual
compensation practices. As the Seventh Circuit recognized:
The scheme alleged by Leveski, in contrast, [to the one alleged in
Graves] involves a much more sophisticated—and more difficult to
detect—violation of Department of Education requirements. Leveski
does not allege that either her compensation or her continuation as an
ITT employee depended on explicit percentages or quotas. In fact, she
acknowledges that ITT claimed to compensate her based on a wide
range of factors (including appearance, attitude, and participation in
continuing education classes). But Leveski alleges that how ITT
claimed to compensate her and how ITT actually compensated her
were very different. Despite ITT’s claims, Leveski believes that her
compensation was based on only one thing: the number of students
Leveski brought into ITT (and as a result, the amount of money
Leveski brought into ITT).235

Relying on United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush University Medical
Center,236 the Seventh Circuit noted that reviewing FCA claims, as the
district court had done, “at the highest level of generality . . . in order to
wipe out qui tam suits that rest on genuinely new and material
information is not sound.”237 To trigger the public-disclosure bar, the
Seventh Circuit held in Leveski that it is not enough for two cases to be
brought against the same defendant for the same general wrongdoing.238
The relators in Goldberg were an orthopedic surgeon and a director
of real estate at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago.239
Together, they alleged that Rush was improperly billing Medicare for
services performed by teaching physicians that were actually performed
by inadequately supervised residents.240 During the 1990s, both the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued research studies concluding that
improper billing for services performed by unsupervised residents was a
widespread problem in teaching hospitals nationwide.241 But the
relators in Goldberg alleged a different scheme from the one described
in the governmental reports. The reports had accused teaching hospitals

235.
236.
2012).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 830–31 (alteration in original).
United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 680 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir.
Leveski, 719 F.3d at 831 (quoting Goldberg, 680 F.3d at 934).
Id. at 832–33.
Goldberg, 680 F.3d at 934.
Id. at 934–35.
Id. at 934.
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of billing for services performed by residents who were not supervised,
but the Goldberg relators alleged that Rush billed for services
performed by residents who were not adequately supervised.242
According to the relators, Rush scheduled teaching physicians for
multiple surgeries at once, such that “even if the teaching physician
were present for the ‘critical’ portion of one [surgery] . . . the surgeon
could not have been ‘immediately available’ for the rest of each
procedure” as required by Medicare.243 After reviewing the relators’
allegations, the Seventh Circuit held that the relators
[A]llege[d] a kind of deceit that the GAO report does not attribute to
any teaching hospital. Unless we understand the “unsupervised
services” conclusion of the [governmental reports] at the highest level
of generality—as covering all ways that supervision could be missing
or inadequate—the allegations of these relators are not “substantially
similar.”244

Judge Pratt affirmed ITT’s motion to dismiss on August 8, 2011,245
denied a motion for partial reconsideration by Ms. Leveski (based
largely on Baltazar) on January 30, 2012,246 and issued her sanctions
order against Ms. Leveski’s lawyers on March 26, 2012.247
Two months later, on May 21, 2012, the Seventh Circuit issued its
opinion in Goldberg. This chain of events meant that Judge Pratt did
not have the benefit of the Circuit’s reasoning in Goldberg when she
wrote her opinions. Nonetheless, this should not have mattered because
Goldberg logically followed Baltazar, as Ms. Leveski argued in her
briefs in the district court. Indeed, because Goldberg was not decided
until later, Ms. Leveski’s counsel relied heavily on Baltazar in its briefs,
prompting Judge Pratt to opine that Ms. Leveski’s counsel “overstated
the impact of Baltazar,”248 and that Baltazar was not a “gamechanger.”249 The Seventh Circuit, however, thought Baltazar changed
the game, and it interpreted its decisions in Baltazar and Goldberg
differently from the district court.
Goldberg held that to bar a subsequent case, factual disclosure of a
242. Id.
243. Id. at 935.
244. Id. at 936.
245. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00867-TWP, 2011
WL 3471071 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011).
246. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 266943 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012).
247. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012).
248. Leveski, 2012 WL 266943, at *10–11.
249. Id.
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fraud scheme must be specific and not made with a high level of
generality.250 Leveski held that the specific fraud scheme must be
exposed in the prior disclosure for the cases to be substantially similar
enough for the public disclosure to apply.251 A complaint containing
allegations of multiple fraud schemes from those previously disclosed
should not trigger the public-disclosure bar.252 The “notice of the
fraud” required to trigger the FCA’s public disclosure must put the
government on actual notice rather than on inquiry notice of the fraud
scheme alleged.
Goldberg builds on the teachings of United States ex rel. Baltazar v.
Warden,253 where the Seventh Circuit reversed a dismissal based on the
public-disclosure bar after it found that the pertinent allegations must be
company-specific.254 There, chiropractor Kelly Baltazar brought an
FCA claim against the chiropractic group for which she worked,
alleging the group “added to her billing slips services that had not been
rendered and [upcoded] for services that had been performed.”255
Prior to her suit, the GAO issued reports detailing widespread
fraudulent Medicare billing practices by chiropractic groups without
naming specific groups that were guilty of these abusive practices.256
Nevertheless, the district judge believed that these reports were enough
to preclude federal-court jurisdiction over Baltazar’s claim.257 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that that Baltazar’s suit was “based on
her own knowledge rather than the published reports” and she had
“supplied vital facts that were not in the public domain.”258
The Seventh Circuit analogized the information required to provide a
“public disclosure” to the discovery of the fraud required to trigger
running of the statute of limitations in securities cases.259 There is a
good reason for such a requirement. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in
United States ex rel. Matthews v. Bank of Farmington: “The point of
public disclosure of a false claim against the government is to bring it to
the attention of the authorities.”260
250.
2012).
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 680 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir.
Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 827, 833.
United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 635 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 866–70.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 868.
United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999).
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Baltazar paved the way for Goldberg and then Leveski by
establishing that particular fraudsters—as opposed to an entire
industry—had to be identified to trigger a sufficient public disclosure to
bar a subsequent lawsuit, because industry-wide disclosures are too
general to constitute specific public disclosures of a specific, identified
company’s fraudulent conduct—a requirement necessary to bring an
FCA action.261
In Baltazar, Judge Easterbrook reasoned that disclosure of an
industry-wide practice should not trigger the public-disclosure bar
because absent the information supplied by the relator the subsequently
Similarly, absent
filed case could not have been brought.262
information of the specific fraud schemes alleged in Goldberg and in
Leveski, those cases could never have been brought. The same straight
line of logic requiring specificity applies to fraud schemes as it does to
generally-known industry practices; it is not enough to know in a
general sense that a company might be committing a certain type of
fraud without specific knowledge of precisely how that fraud scheme is
being implemented.
The public-disclosure standard established by Baltazar, Goldberg,
and Leveski is a practical one requiring an inquiry to determine whether
a public disclosure provided information that reveals fraud. These three
opinions also are consistent with the statutory language of the FCA and
the Seventh Circuit’s earlier interpretation of that language because the
public-disclosure bar only applies when a relator’s case is “based upon”
the public disclosure, and most circuits, including the Seventh Circuit,
interpret “based upon” to mean “substantially similar to.”263
Logically, a case can only be “based upon” or “substantially similar
to” what has been disclosed. Thus, public disclosure occurs only “when
the critical elements exposing the transaction as fraudulent are placed in
Anything else would unduly deter
the public domain.”264
whistleblower relators from bringing FCA actions.
As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue

261. Baltazar, 635 F.3d at 868.
262. Id. at 868 (“The United States could not file suit against a chiropractor, tender copies of
the 1987, 2000, and 2005 Reports, and rest its case.”). Moreover, the decision analogizes to a
notice standard akin to the securities law statute of limitations—which runs only upon discovery
of the actual fraud, not inquiry notice—and the decision contrasted Ms. Baltazar, as a relator, with
the relator in an early case brought on the basis solely of the relator’s knowledge of an industrypervasive practice and where that relator had no information beyond what was publicly disclosed.
263. Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2009).
264. United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir.
2003).
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Shield of Florida, Inc., a similar holding rejected the same industrypractice proposition:
To hold otherwise would preclude any qui tam suit once widespread—
but not universal—fraud in an industry was revealed. The government
often knows on a general level that fraud is taking place and that it and
the taxpayers are losing money. But it has difficulty identifying all of
the individual actors engaged in the fraudulent activity.265

Likewise, as the Seventh Circuit held in Goldberg:
We held in Baltazar that a very high level of generality is
inappropriate, because then disclosure of some frauds could end up
blocking private challenges to many different kinds of fraud. Public
reports disclosed that more than half of all chiropractors in an audited
sample had submitted improper bills to the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. We held that this did not disclose a particular fraud by a
particular chiropractor, because no one could use the published
reports as the basis of litigation; the government could not seek
reimbursement without showing that a particular chiropractor had
committed a particular fraud in a particular way, and we held in
Baltazar that someone who supplied those vital details could not be
thrown out of court under § 3730(e)(4)(A).
Similarly, no one who read the GAO report, or followed the
progress of the PATH audits, would know or even suspect that Rush
University was misrepresenting the “immediate availability” of
teaching physicians during concurrently scheduled procedures. The
allegations in Gear parroted the GAO report; Gear added nothing to
the public disclosure except the name of a teaching hospital, and as the
GAO report suggested that all (or almost all) teaching hospitals billed
for unsupervised work by residents, Gear had not added anything of
value. Goldberg and Beecham, by contrast, allege a kind of deceit that
the GAO report does not attribute to any teaching hospital.266

As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the same reasoning clearly
applied to Leveski: no one reading Graves would be alerted to the two
new fraud schemes that Ms. Leveski alleged. Thus, that court
concluded: “Our lengthy discussion of Leveski’s case has shown that
Leveski’s case appears to be substantial, not frivolous.”267 The case,
being remanded, is currently pending in the Southern District of Indiana
in Indianapolis.
While Main established the viability of FCA actions against for-profit
schools like ITT, Leveski broke new ground in applying the FCA’s

265. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 566 (11th Cir. 1994).
266. United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 680 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir.
2012).
267. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 839 (7th Cir. 2013).
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public-disclosure language by building upon earlier Seventh Circuit
law. Together, Baltazar, Goldberg, and Leveski are grounded in an
understanding of the FCA, consistent with its aim of encouraging
whistleblowers to come forward, these three decisions provide simple,
clear, objective, and workable guidelines for adjudicating the scope of
the public-disclosure issue.268
B. Original Source
Because the Seventh Circuit decided the public-disclosure issue in
Ms. Leveski’s favor, the court could have avoided addressing the
original-source exception to the public-disclosure bar issue.
Nonetheless, it also ruled in Ms. Leveski’s favor on this issue. The
Seventh Circuit held that she had direct and independent knowledge of
her allegations and, therefore, was the original source of them.269
In Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held
that a relator’s knowledge was not “direct” if the relator “had no
knowledge whatsoever” of the fraudulent conduct before hearing from
an attorney.270 Specifically, ITT argued that because Ms. Leveski never
held a high position of authority, never set employee compensation, and
never filed PPAs, that somehow meant that she lacked “sufficient
knowledge of ITT’s illegal compensation practices” to be, in the words
of the district court, “a true whistleblower,”271 a term not defined in any
legal opinion.
But the Seventh Circuit found that Ms. Leveski had substantial
knowledge of the facts underlying her action,272 and that her allegations
were specific and personal and came from conversations to which she
was a party.273 The Seventh Circuit also pointed out that “we have

268. This aim was embodied in a 2010 change in the FCA that gives the DOJ the discretion to
permit a relator to litigate an FCA even when there has been a public disclosure and the relator is
not an original source. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). This revision of the FCA,
consistent with the FCA’s purpose, is an acknowledgement of the fact that the government has
only limited resources and cannot bring many meritorious cases, even those where there has been
a public disclosure. Just being able to alert the government to a fraud scheme does not
accomplish much regarding the purpose of the FCA if the government can only pursue a small
amount of such cases.
269. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 836.
270. Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 921 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
271. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs. Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00867-TWP, 2011
WL 3471071, at 7 (D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011) (dismissal order); see Leveski, 719 F.3d at 838–39
(finding that relators need only show “inferential” rather than personal or direct knowledge of
fraud).
272. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 833–34.
273. Id.
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never required a relator to have previously occupied a position of
authority, and in fact, we have previously found relators who were even
greater outsiders than Leveski to possess direct and independent
knowledge of their FCA claims.”274
The Seventh Circuit also implicitly found that Judge Pratt misapplied
the law in assessing whether Ms. Leveski was an original source.275
Judge Pratt noted that while she “acknowledges the principles in” the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of
Green Bay, which should have been binding on her and controlling, she
was nevertheless “inclined to adopt the reason set forth in Schultz v.
Devry, Inc.,”276 an Illinois district court opinion.277 Yet, relying largely
on Lamers278 and United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp.,279
the Seventh Circuit in Leveski reaffirmed existing law that Ms. Leveski
need not occupy a position of authority at ITT to be an original
source.280
The relator in Lamers, in fact, was even further removed from
observing any fraudulent conduct than Ms. Leveski, and yet the Seventh
Circuit held that he possessed sufficient direct and independent
knowledge to make him an original source.281 In Lamers, the relator,
Alan Lamers, owned a private bus company that had contracted with the
City of Green Bay to bus school children.282 After it lost the contract,
he filed an FCA suit alleging that the city of Green Bay, a competitor
who obtained a contract, had fraudulently represented to the Federal
Transit Administration (“FTA”) that it was in compliance with FTA
regulations in exchange for FTA funding.283
Although he had never worked for Green Bay or witnessed or
participated in the city’s filing of compliance forms, the Seventh Circuit
held that Mr. Lamers was an original source because he had direct and
independent knowledge derived from walking the streets of Green Bay
and observing the buses in action.284 Based on these observations, he

274. Id. at 838.
275. Id. at 838–39.
276. Schultz v. DeVry Inc., No. CIV.A. 07 C 5425, 2009 WL 562286 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2009).
277. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00867-TWP, 2011
WL 3471071, at 6 (D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011) (dismissal order).
278. United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).
279. United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2009).
280. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 838–39.
281. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1017.
282. Id. at 1014.
283. Id. at 1015.
284. Id. at 1017.
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alleged that Green Bay failed to comply with FTA regulations.285
Because his observations called into question whether Green Bay was in
compliance with FTA regulations, it was unnecessary for him to prove
personal knowledge that Green Bay had fraudulently certified its
compliance with FTA regulations at the outset of his suit.286 Green Bay
had to certify that it was in compliance because it received FTA
funding, meaning that if Lamers’ allegations were true, Green Bay was
falsely certifying it was in compliance.287
A decade later, in Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corporation, the Seventh
Circuit reaffirmed that a relator need not produce a copy of the
document making the false claim at the outset of the lawsuit.288 There,
Curtis Lusby, a former Rolls-Royce engineer, brought an FCA suit
claiming that the company was falsely certifying that the engines it built
for the Air Force conformed to military specifications.289 In response,
Rolls-Royce argued that as an engineer Mr. Lusby had not seen “any of
the invoices and representations that Rolls-Royce submitted to its
customers.”290 Although Mr. Lusby admitted that he did not have
access to the paperwork, he countered that “Rolls-Royce must have
submitted at least one such certificate [of compliance], or the military
services would not have paid for the goods . . . .”291 The Seventh
Circuit agreed that it could be inferred that Rolls-Royce had submitted
such certifications.292 Moreover, it noted that “[s]ince a relator is
unlikely to have those documents unless he works in the defendant’s
accounting department,” holding otherwise would have “take[n] a big
bite out of qui tam litigation.”293
In Lamers, the Seventh Circuit recognized that a whistleblower
qualifies as an original source when he or she alleges—as Ms. Leveski
did—facts showing the difference between what a government
contractor knew to be the truth and what that contractor concealed and
misrepresented to obtain government funds.294
Lamers, Lusby, and now Leveski recognize that when the government
is aware of the contractual terms, a relator can still bring great value to

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1999).
United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 850.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1999).
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an FCA action by disclosing facts revealing or evidencing fraudulent
conduct of which the government is not otherwise aware.295 That is
exactly what Ms. Leveski did.
FCA cases can naturally be based on facts that show the difference
between what the contractor told or promised the government and the
true facts of what the contractor did. Whistleblowers possessing such
information provide value, and should be rewarded for bringing critical
information to prove fraudulent conduct to authorities’ attention. Based
on Lamers and Lusby, the Seventh Circuit, in overruling the district
court, held that Ms. Leveski was not required prior to the filing of her
lawsuit to have had advance knowledge of the PPAs in which ITT
certified compliance with the HEA.296
Ms. Leveski’s complaint alleged that ITT received federal funding
throughout her employment, and ITT could only have received federal
funding by falsely certifying compliance with the HEA. Her companyspecific facts enabled her to file a complaint that satisfied Rule 9(b).
The so-called missing information—that ITT signed a PPA in which it
represented it would comply with the recruiting compensation laws—
was known to the DOE and, for that very reason, was of no independent
value to the DOE or the DOJ. The critical information of falsity, the
missing key evidence that ITT was deceiving the government, came
from Ms. Leveski.
Despite what ITT told the DOE, Ms. Leveski—and only Ms.
Leveski—provided crucial facts of how ITT was, in practice,
fraudulently compensating its recruiters. She did not provide a legal
theory because she is not a lawyer. Laypersons know facts; they often
do not know the legal implications of those facts, and the FCA does not
require them to know the law. Knowing the facts was enough. Ms.
Leveski provided critical facts establishing ITT’s fraud, that is, the
method of compensating recruiters per head, which ITT concealed from
the DOE. 297
The district court’s conclusion that Ms. Leveski was not a “true
whistleblower” not only ignored the court record, but also was contrary

295. These cases—and similar holdings from other circuits—are also consistent with
amendments to the FCA’s original-source language made applicable to complaints filed after
2010. Based on these amendments one can qualify as an original source if one has knowledge
that “materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions . . . .” 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)(B)(2) (2012).
296. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2013).
297. All education institutions receiving federal funding must submit a signed PPA to the
DOE as a condition of participating in the federal lending programs. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14
(2014).
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to the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court’s (then-applicable)
requirements for how to assess whether a whistleblower is or is not an
original source, which then required looking to the allegations in the
complaint not the public disclosure.298
Ms. Leveski, in fact, was a true whistleblower with valuable
information for the government, and it was clear to the Seventh Circuit
that the company-specific factual allegations in her complaint could
only have come from her based on her experience at ITT for over a
decade. She provided crucial facts of how ITT was, in practice,
compensating its recruiters and how it was paying its FAAs.
Whistleblowers often do not come from the top echelon of companies
they sue and they rarely perpetuate the fraud they report. They need not
be the chief beneficiaries of fraud or criminal masterminds to bring
value to an FCA action. They need not be FCA scholars. The key is
that they should have enough original knowledge to add to what has
been publicly disclosed. Thus, the Seventh Circuit applied and
advanced circuit law consistent with the letter and spirit of the FCA to
create a workable interpretation of the public-disclosure bar and its
original-source exception. Encouraging whistleblowers with specific
and original information serves those FCA purposes.
C. Lawyer Solicitation in False Claims Act Actions
The Seventh Circuit also reversed the District Court’s sanctions
order.299 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit noted:
[T]he district [court] concluded that Leveski’s counsel had continued
to pursue a “frivolous” case despite “unmistakably clear warnings that
[they were] playing with fire by pushing the case forward.” As
indicated above, we disagree with this conclusion. Our lengthy
discussion of Leveski’s case has shown that Leveski’s case appears to
be substantial, not frivolous.300

For example, although the district court’s entire basis for the sanctions
298. As the Seventh Circuit held:
In evaluating whether Leveski is an “original source” of her claims, we find our
language in Baltazar, 635 F.3d at 869, particularly enlightening: “The question is
whether the relator is an original source of the allegations in the complaint and not, as
the district court supposed, whether the relator is the source of the information in the
published reports.” Thus, it is not appropriate to ask whether Leveski was the original
source of the allegations in Graves. Nor is it appropriate to ask whether Leveski was
the first person to bring HEA violations by for-profit educational institutions to the
public’s attention. Rather, it is appropriate to ask whether Leveski is the original
source of the specific allegations in her complaint.
Leveski, 719 F.3d at 836.
299. Id. at 839.
300. Id. (citation omitted).
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order was that the lawyer who filed the lawsuit, Timothy Matusheski,
supposedly “pluck[ed]” Ms. Leveski “out of thin air,” the Seventh
Circuit after reviewing the relevant facts held that she was a highly
knowledgeable relator.301
The Seventh Circuit also held Mr.
Matusheski did nothing wrong and that it was “not troubled by
Leveski’s admission that she had not contemplated filing suit until
Matusheski contacted her.”302 The Seventh Circuit added: “we
specifically asked ITT at oral argument what rule of professional
conduct that Matusheski’s ‘recruitment’ of Leveski violated. ITT could
not supply us with a single rule.”303 As a telling preview of the opinion,
at oral arguments for the appeal, Judge Tinder asked the following
questions, which were answered as follows by ITT’s counsel:
Judge Tinder: Did the District Court ever find that Mr. Matusheski’s
solicitation of Ms. Leveski was a violation of a disciplinary code or a
Code of Professional Responsibility?
...
Mr. Smith: I think her words were, “It’s as unseemly as it is
unethical.”
...
Judge Tinder: What finding did she make on that, other than making
that general statement of—
Mr. Smith: I don’t think she specified. I don’t think she went into the
specifics . . . .
Judge Tinder: That troubles me. It just seems that her opinion,
particularly relative to sanctions, is just dominated by this distaste for
the manner in which Mr. Matusheski came into contact with Ms.
Leveski.304

ITT’s lawyer was right: The district court issued sanctions without
specifying legal authority forbidding the conduct the court claimed was
offensive.305
Citing Supreme Court precedent in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,306
the Seventh Circuit held that lawyers clearly are permitted to advise
301. Id. at 819, 839.
302. Id. at 837.
303. Id. at 837 n.2.
304. Oral Argument at 26:32, Leveski, 719 F.3d 818 (No. 12-2891), available at http://media.c
a7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=12&casenumber=2891&listCase=List+case%28
s%29.
305. United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0867-TWP-MJD,
2012 WL 1028794 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012) (sanctions order), overruled by Leveski, 719 F.3d
818; United States ex rel. Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00867-TWP-MJD, 2011
WL 3471071 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2011) (dismissal order), overruled by Leveski, 719 F.3d 818.
306. 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) (noting that advertising allows a “supplier [attorney] to inform
a potential purchaser [client] of the availability and terms of exchange”).
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potential future clients of both the contents of the law and their rights
under the law; it is upon that basis that attorneys are permitted to
advertise their services.307 “After all, ‘potential clients rarely know in
advance what services they do in fact need,’ and in some cases,
potential clients do not know that they need any services from an
attorney.”308
Although she knew that most of ITT’s students accepted substantial
federal funding, Ms. Leveski did not apparently know about the PPAs
that ITT’s chief executive officer signed until she did some research on
her own or a lawyer told her about them.309 She also lacked the legal
training and FCA background to fully understand the legal theory that
Judge Easterbrook held for the first time in Main formed the basis for
FCA liability. From such irrelevant facts, the district court crafted its
dismissal and sanctions orders.
As the Seventh Circuit first held in Baltazar, there is nothing in the
FCA that prevents whistleblowers from bringing a case after being
informed of an industry-wide practice or by learning such facts by doing
their own independent research so long as the whistleblower has
company-specific information to support the allegations in an FCA
complaint.310 As Judge Easterbrook wrote:
[T]o say that a report identifying a uniform practice activates §
3730(a)(4)(A) [the public-disclosure bar] does not imply anything
about the effect of a report disclosing that some but not all firms use a
practice. Once the GAO concluded that teaching hospitals routinely
disregarded the required distinction between work in the teaching
program and work as an attending physician, the only extra fact
required was that the defendant is a medical school or teaching
hospital. That’s public knowledge. . . . Baltazar’s suit, by contrast,
supplied vital facts that were not in the public domain: that Advanced
Healthcare Associates not only was submitting false claims but also
was submitting them knowing them to be false, and thus was
committing fraud.311

Leveski follows this logic. The PPAs on which the district court
dwelled were a red herring. The key to determining whether one is an
original source is the value of that person’s information. Here, Ms.
Leveski supplied valuable, specific information about ITT’s conduct

307. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 837.
308. Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 386 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
309. See id. at 838 (“Leveski, ITT points out, was never in a position of authority during her
employment; she was never responsible for setting employee compensation or filing PPAs.”)
310. United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 635 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2011).
311. Id.
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that was not in the public domain and was based on her personal
knowledge and experience.312
Ms. Leveski might not have known that she was sitting on
information that was potentially valuable to the government until she
spoke with a lawyer.313 This proved decisive to the district court’s
sanctions order, but it should not have. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that was not troubling that Ms. Leveski first learned the potential value
of her information from her original lawyer, Mr. Matusheski, and that
common occurrence in litigation should not have barred her claims,
much less resulted in a sanctions order.314 Judge Tinder wrote:
The annals of legal history are full of examples of lawyers playing a
vital role in encouraging parties to litigate. If done in a proper
manner—that is, within the confines of the applicable rules of
professional conduct—there is nothing about such attorney
involvement that negates the validity of a suit.315

Thus, Leveski recognized that lawyers can play a key role in serving
the government/private partnership upon which the FCA relies be
effective. Lawyers and courts creatively develop and expand the
contours of the law by pursuing theories that appear novel at first as in
Main, which recognized potential FCA liability against for-profit
colleges. The Seventh Circuit in Leveski also recognized that lawyers
need latitude to pursue these cases vigorously.
Contrary to the FCA, the district court’s holding required Ms.
Leveski to be conversant with this evolving area of FCA law prior to
doing any of her own research and prior to her consulting with a lawyer
in order to be a “true whistleblower.” Even though no law supported
such a conclusion, the district court somehow believed it was fair to
require that Ms. Leveski, a layperson with no legal training, to possess
the legal knowledge and acumen of an experienced FCA lawyer as a
required prerequisite to becoming a relator.
In the current age of social activism and of marketing and
competition for clients, solicitation is part of the legal landscape and
should not be frowned upon. Instead, it is a constitutional right
belonging to lawyers and prospective lawyers, particularly so when it
comes to the FCA whose success depends upon encouraging
whistleblowers to come forward and identify fraud and the public
benefits from these relationships. Sometimes lawyers and courts test or

312.
313.
314.
315.

Leveski, 719 F.3d at 833–34.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 838.
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refine these boundaries, like in Main, where creative lawyers pursued
the theory that schools that recruit poorly qualified students through
illegal recruiting practices in violation of a statute violated their PPAs
by improperly extracting taxpayer funds, and Judge Easterbrook then
held that such conduct stated an FCA claim.316 The Seventh Circuit
recognized that lawyers should not be punished for doing their jobs or
for being creative or entrepreneurial within the bounds of the law.
CONCLUSION
Due to periodic amendments, and various court decisions, the FCA
has had a checkered history of effectiveness following its adoption in
1863. Some amendments, particularly those adopted in 1943, included
provisions that took the teeth out of the statute, sharply limiting its
efficacy as an important tool to deter fraudulent conduct by government
contractors and to recover damages for such abuse.
In 1986, in the face of widespread fraud by such contractors,
Congress overhauled the FCA to encourage qui tam suits and in so
doing, make them effective tools to recover damages and deter
misconduct. Critical to the effectiveness of the FCA is: (a) a narrow
reading of the public-disclosure bar—applying it only where the
disclosure is truly public, not a buried fact in some government filing;
and (b) a broad reading of the original-source rule—treating a relator as
an original source where she has provided relevant information not
previously known to the government and not requiring the relator to
fully understand the legal significance of such information.
In Main, Baltazar, Rush, Lamers, Lusby, and Leveski, the Seventh
Circuit handed down groundbreaking decisions that have advanced the
purposes of the FCA. The language and legislative history of the FCA
supports these decisions.
Central to its core purposes, the FCA encourages whistleblowers to
come forward if they have personal knowledge of facts valuable to the
government showing fraudulent conduct. Laypersons are not expected
to have legal knowledge or knowledge of the legal consequences of
facts that they discover directly and independently. Although relators
might know valuable facts upon which an FCA case can be built, the
Seventh Circuit has recognized that the FCA does not require that
whistleblowers know the legal implications of those facts.
In so doing, the Seventh Circuit advanced FCA public-disclosure and
original-source law. Moreover, in Leveski, the Seventh Circuit

316. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2005).
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strengthened the FCA by strongly endorsing a strong proactive role of
whistleblower lawyers in soliciting potential clients, informing them of
their rights and the legal significance of the facts known to them. These
are important contributions to a statute whose viability depends on
whistleblowers coming forward to expose fraud assisted by lawyers
willing and able to represent them.

